Paper on Leniency
September 13th, 2005In August 2005 I finished my Master Thesis ‘Crime But No Punishment: An empirical review of the EU’s 1996 Leniency Notice and cartel fines in article 81 proceedings’. The main results of this paper are that a leniency policy (which grants fine reductions to firms that report illegal cartels they are participating in) is successful in breaking up hard-core cartels and in reducing the time needed to investigate cartels. However, I did not find support for the increase of information due to the leniency policy, nor support for a deterrent effect of leniency.
I also did case studies of all cartels that have received full leniency in the EU. These case studies revealed that many cartels had been prosecuted earlier in the United States and/or Canada. According to its advocates, a leniency policy should be successful in the uncovering of previously unknown cartels. Yet my research shows that a more assertive role of the Commission might have uncovered these cartels as well, raising questions regarding the effectiveness of leniency policies on this point.
The paper is available for download here. Alternately the paper may be downloaded from the website of the Economics Network for Competition and Regulation (ENCORE) here.